Book Review: The Open Society and Its Enemies by Cohen, Felix S.
REVIEWS 
THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES. By Karl S. Popper, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. v, 732. $7.50. 
DURING the Years of the Cold War it is well to remember the ancient 
Chinese proverb: the first result of any war is that the adversaries adopt 
each other's vices. 
Today when the Open Society and its Enemies are locked in a bitter struggle, 
it is painful to record how, step by step, each antagonist takes on the worst 
features of its adversary. The Communist totalitarians who once denounced 
capitalism for its huge expenditures on armaments, for its imperial control 
of "backward" areas, for its long working hours, for its government control 
of labor unions, and for the wide disparities in its income structure, now 
copy each of the vices they once denounced. And the champions of the Open 
Society so quickly forget how they once denounced the totalitarianism of 
peace-time conscription, state control of wages and prices, government by 
executive order, iron curtains blocking the once-free movement of human 
beings across national boundaries, and all the techniques that have been 
developed since the Inquisition and the Star Chamber to eradicate what the 
Japanese Government used to call Dangerous Thoughts. 
Why do so many professed champions of the Open Society rush so precipi- 
tately to embrace the weapons and the uniform of the enemy? Is it because 
they secretly admire the supposed efficiency of totalitarianism more than they 
hate its brutality? Is it because of a "treason of the intellectuals?" Have 
those to whom the Open Society looks for leadership and inspiration sold 
their souls to the Devil? And have the great idealistic philosophers from 
Plato to Hegel served as the Devil's salesmen to dignify intellectual treason? 
It is to questions of this sort that Karl Popper has devoted the logical and 
historical studies that make up his 732-page treatise on The Open Society 
and Its Enemies. Whether or not one agrees with the drift of his argument 
one is compelled to admire the vigor and sincerity with which Popper drives 
towards the heart of fundamental ideological struggles in which our future 
is being shaped. For at least he sees, as Heine saw,1 that "proud men of 
action . .. are nothing but unconscious instruments of the men of thought," 
the Platos, Lockes, Rousseaus, Hegels, and Marxes who stand outside the 
battles of their times and, in their studies, arrange the battles of future 
generations. 
Basically, it is Popper's contention that the totalitarian assault upon the 
Open Society was plotted by Plato, Hegel, Marx, and their followers. By 
glorifying power, defending lies, and undermining free inquiry, these so-called 
idealists have corrupted the youth of our generation and of many generations 
1. p.301. 
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dead and gone. To vindicate the cause of freedom it is therefore necessary 
to expose these evil geniuses and to clean up the intellectual garbage dumps 
they have left behind; that, at least, is Popper's general thesis, which makes 
a reasonably coherent volume of what he himself describes, with some justice, 
as "merely scattered marginal notes" to a history of historicism.2 
Plato, according to Popper's analysis, is the perennial enemy of progress, 
since he "teaches that change is evil, and that rest is divine."3 The Greeks, 
Popper observes, were "the first to make the step from tribalism to human- 
itarianism"4 and were thus the spiritual founders of our western civilization. 
At the time when Athens was at the center of the world's trade in goods 
and ideas, and Greek science was breaking the chains of ancient tribal mis- 
trusts and superstitions, "Plato was longing for the lost unity of tribal life."5 
Inspired by his "hatred of the society in which he was living,"6 Plato elabo- 
rated a political program which "far from being morally superior to total- 
itarianism, is fundamentally identical with it."7 Plato then "libels his great 
teacher"8 by putting into the mouth of Socrates the elaborate scheme of 
trickery by which the rulers of a Platonic Republic or any other dictatorship 
of race or class can manage to keep human masses under subjection. In- 
spired by his hatred of the democratic tendencies of his native land, Plato 
was "led to defend lying, political miracles, tabooistic superstition, the sup- 
pression of truth, and ultimately, brutal violence."9 "The theory of the 
Inquisition, more especially, can be described as purely Platonic."0l 
The evil influence of Plato, according to our genial author, gave backbone 
to "medieval authoritarianism"1l but needed renewing at about the time when 
American and French revolutions were popularizing the idea that the people 
could shape their own futures if they were willing to devote lives and risk 
death in the cause of freedom. At this juncture Hegel appeared on the scene 
to give a new quirk to the philosophical defense of authoritarianism and 
tribalism. The reality of change could no longer be denied, but change itself 
could be glorified as a superhuman world-force before which human reason 
must abdicate. 
By disqualifying human reason and rational criticism of prevailing forces, 
Hegel was able to discredit all criticism of his employer, the Prussian Gov- 
ernment. The "identity of Hegelian historicism with the philosophy of 
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quick and simple changes by which Communism and Fascism replace each 
other in the sagas of 20th century Realpolitik. 
Although Popper is too much restrained by modern literary conventions 
to express his own frank opinion of Hegel he does express enthusiastic 
concurrence in the comment of Schopenhauer, "who had the pleasure of 
knowing Hegel personally and . . . drew the following excellent picture of 
the master: 
'Hegel, installed from above, by the powers that be, as the certified 
Great Philosopher, was a flat-headed, insipid, nauseating, illiterate 
charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together 
and dishing up the craziest mystifying nonsense. This nonsense has 
been noisily proclaimed as immortal wisdom by mercenary followers 
and readily accepted as such by all fools, who thus joined into as 
perfect a chorus of admiration as had ever been heard before. The 
extensive field of spiritual influence with which Hegel was furnished 
by those in power has enabled him to achieve the intellectual corrup- 
tion of a whole generation.' "13 
Although Marx reacted violently to Hegel's notion of world-history as 
an evolutionary unfolding of ideas, and insisted that the real world was 
material, that Hegel had stood it on its head, and that the new philosophy of 
dialectical materialism could turn it right side up, Marx succeeded in copying 
the worst vices of the Hegelian philosophy. Thus, in spite of "his keen 
sociological insight into the conditions of his own time, and of his invincible 
humanitarianism and sense of justice,"14 Marx and his followers, Lenin and 
Stalin, ended up with a world-view that suppresses human reason and the 
rational criticism of prevailing forces. 
Such is the main course of the author's diatribe; along the way he polishes 
off the "antidemocratic" Heraclitus,15 the "intelligence-destroying influence 
of Aristotle,"16 the "windbag Fichte,"17 and the "irrationalist authorities" 
Whitehead and Toynbee.18 
It would be easy, but scarcely illuminating, to dismiss all this with the 
words of Emerson, "Why so hot, little man?" or with Emerson's remark to 
young Holmes who, sharing some of Popper's distrust of grandiloquence, 
polished off Plato in a student paper and received Emerson's crisp comment: 
"When you strike at a king you must kill him." 
It is likely that Plato, Hegel and Marx will survive the Popper attack and 
continue, for better or worse, to give seminal ideas, insights, and quirks of 
13. p. 228. 
14. p.310. 
15. p. 16. 
16. p.407. 
17. p.249. 
18. pp. 431-5 et seq. 
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perspective to those who seek a faint ray of light on the muddy conflicts of 
our world and the dark outlines of our future. For what was important 
about these thinkers was not the platitudes of Plato nor the mystic muddles 
in which Hegel's arguments generally drop out of sight nor the cocksure 
prophecies of Marx and his followers. 
What was signficant about these philosophers was the questions they 
formulated, questions which have given new dimensions to our thinking. 
It is to Plato, as Popper admits, that we largely owe "that great spiritual 
revolution, the invention of critical discussion."19 It is to Hegel that we 
chiefly owe our modern concern with the development of ideas and the mean- 
ing of history, and our emancipation from the long era in which a history 
of art or philosophy was a formless catalogue or chronicle of unrelated 
individuals and incidents. It is to Marx that we largely owe the critical 
question that is addressed today to every legal or social institution: How 
does it affect the productive forces of society and the livelihood of the common 
man? And having asked explosive questions that neither they nor their 
contemporaries could answer, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx 
will continue to challenge the thoughts and energies of generations yet unborn. 
And those who are anxious to understand the rhythms and patterns of ideas 
to which the world's hobnailed boots now move and by which atoms and 
governments disintegrate will have to seek out in the writings of these men 
something more than Mr. Popper found in them. 
An inspired American philosopher and teacher of philosophers, Wilmon 
Sheldon, has justly observed that philosophers are generally right in what 
they affirm of their own vision and generally wrong in what they deny of 
the vision of others. It may very well be that Popper's own vision of a 
social ethics that frankly faces the realities of the present and the uncertainties 
of the future is more significant than his appraisal of the merits and demerits 
of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. That vision is presented with courage and 
patience. It reminds us that we can make our own future, and that in the 
process of building a better society we can pursue the methods of 
science 
if our hypotheses are specific enough to allow pragmatic tests. It shows 
how much easier it is to shape pragmatic tests to the elimination of specific 
social evils than to the creation of Utopias.20 It reminds us that in the struggle 
to preserve and extend the moral values of the Open Society none of us can 
escape a moral responsibility for the consequences of our action or inaction. 
It reminds us that (as Plato and Aristotle pointed out long ago) power 
corrupts those who wield it, and the conclusion follows that we cannot win 
security by surrendering our freedoms. For the state to which we sell free- 
dom for security may take from us, along with our freedom, even that little 
security which we had at the start of the bargain. Thus Popper focuses 
19. p. 172. 
20. p.571. 
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attention on a question which European political thinkers from Plato to Stalin 
have consistently overlooked in their search for The Perfect State, the ques- 
tion of how the evil that governments do, by reason of the corruption of 
power, may be practically minimized. That question is not original with 
Popper. The whole American tradition of disrespect for constituted authority 
makes this question central in our political thinking and this helps to explain 
why the United States has prospered so greatly under so many incompetent 
presidents and governors. But Popper writes out of the heart of the European 
political tradition, in which respect for authority goes hand in hand with the 
assumption that government is an exercise of superior wisdom or morality. 
That Popper and a few other political scientists, here and abroad, have come 
to doubt that assumption is a good sign. 
It did not take philosophers like Plato or Marx to invent the theory that 
the state can do no wrong: this is the natural assumption of every oriental 
despotism. What Plato and Marx (with Hegel's unintended help) did was 
to develop a technique of reasoning by which any existing regime could be 
criticized. If we are to improve these techniques of rational criticism of 
political institutions, as Popper most earnestly desires, we cannot afford to 
ignore the forms of the dialogue and the dialectic that Plato and Marx 
perfected. That Plato traced the logical presuppositions of tribalism and 
Marx the logical presuppositions of economic dictatorship may help us to 
avoid the dangers of both. 
Not many years ago, a materialist-minded member of the U.S. Senate 
grasped his Bible and thundered: "It has been said on the highest authority: 
Skin for skin, yea all that a man hath 
will he give for his life." 
That was a bad mistake, because his adversary in the debate promptly 
replied that he had always suspected that the orator regarded the devil as 
his highest authority and that it cleared the atmosphere now to have this 
admission made publicly on the floor of the Senate. 
If Scripture can quote Satan in a moral drama like the Book of Job 
without becoming Satanic, if a novelist like Cervantes can write of the hero 
of La Mancha without becoming Quixotic, then is it not possible for a 
philosopher like Plato to explore the implications of tribalism without becom- 
ing identified with one or more of the characters in his dramatic and explosive 
dialogues? And when Marx saw what his followers had done with his 
insights, did he not have every right to thank God that he was not a Marxist? 
This reviewer makes no pretense of knowing enough of Greek history to 
criticize Popper's opinion of what Plato really thought about the characters 
in his dialogues and their diverging views. But is that question of any real 
importance? Do we need to know why Einstein turned to physics in order 
to appreciate the classic beauty of his mass-energy formula? To trace the 
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logical and historical consequences of ideas we loathe is not a loathsome 
task but one of the greatest services that any lover of wisdom can ever per- 
form. Despite Popper's loathing for his predecessors he contributes most to 
our understanding when he walks in Platonic and Marxian paths, not sub- 
missively as some Platonists and Marxists have done, but courageously, 
smiling at temporarily prevailing authorities with the same smile that curled 
the lips of Plato or Karl Marx. 
FELIX S. COHENt 
CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY: By A. Janes Casner and W. Barton Leach. 
Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1950. Pp. xliii, 1326. $9.00. 
HERE is an impressive, skillfully done monument, marking with great 
clarity the present position of enlightened conservatives in the war between 
embattled teachers of property law and Professor Myres McDougal. 
McDougal has exacted some slight concessions from the enemy, mostly tagged 
on at the end of a long book. Greater concessions than actually materialize 
to training for policy making are implied in an admonition to law freshmen- 
prepare yourselves "to provide a very large proportion of the national leader- 
ship at all levels of authority."' But, in his preface of shop talk for pro- 
fessors, Mr. Casner reassures teachers that direct training for public policy 
making is not his or Professor Leach's goal. "In our view", he says, "the 
first-year property course is basically and primarily a private-law course 
dealing with the representation of private clients."2 This is definitely not a 
book from which to teach "the ideology of state planning"-the object, a 
Harvard law graduate has recently charged, of Yale's first year property 
course.3 
What the Book Covers 
This is a fat book; its coverage is tremendous. The first year student 
meets cases and information previously concealed from him until he took 
second or third year courses, (if he could work them in) like mortgages, 
servitudes, vendor-purchaser, and conveyancing. The best job of text writing 
ever done in a law student's book, and a strong-willed refusal to use cases 
that do not raise big questions suitable for a survey course, make this ambitious 
coverage possible. Whether Professor Casner covers all 1300 pages of the 
book with his students is not disclosed. Professor Leach, in his now mildly 
famous dissenting preface, admits that he leaves out the personal property 
material. 
tVisiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. 
1. p. 14 
2. p. ix. 
3. John B. Dempsey dissenting to A Report on the Yale Law Curriculnm, 37 A.B.A. J. 
655, 711 (1951). 
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